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Abstract 
Developing administrative and financial mechanisms to achieve transparency and compliance with 
legal frameworks related to mine operation and closure is a major challenge. Ensuring the appropriate 
level of disclosure, transparency, and accountability of all compliant and non-compliant parties, and 
accessibility of this information to external interested parties is a cornerstone of achieving a well-
governed minerals sector. This research investigates mining company voluntary environmental 
disclosures in Zambia as an indicator of how the EITI may or may not achieve transparency and 
accountability. Our research findings drew on three sources: literature review, qualitative primary data 
with EITI and government officials and content analysis to compare public environmental reporting 
via company websites of a total of 27 mining companies operating in Zambia. Our analysis found that 
non-EITI and EITI selected companies disclose similar provisions for environmental liabilities at 
country, subsidiary, or multinational level. While EITI compliance may improve the environmental 
financial disclosure by mining companies, the detail and specificity of the voluntarily disclosed 
information is insufficiently transparent to third parties investigating whether governments and 
companies are compliant with the law in terms of environmental and governance considerations. We 
propose solutions to achieve transparency in practice by linking aggregated international voluntary 
initiatives (akin to the EITI) with mandatory jurisdiction-level reforms in mining financial securities 
and mine closure legislation accounted at the tenement level that is publicly available. Such reforms 
enable both independent accounting of financial transactions and improved national capacity for 
minerals sector governance that attracts international investment and incentivises an innovative, 
environmentally sustainable, and an economically beneficial mining industry.   
 
Keywords: Extractive industry; minerals; transparency; environmental; legacy. 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature on high-achieving companies in terms of environmental disclosure and 
performance points to the benefits of using objective environmental performance indicators (voluntary 
disclosure theory) (Clarkson et al., 2008; Dye, 1985). Clear and informative disclosures about a 
mining activity’s productivity, regulatory compliance, and environmental impact is deemed important 
for many investors when evaluating a company's value and future prospects, as well as opportunities 
and risks (Holm and Rikhardsson, 2008; Iatridis, 2013b).  
It is widely assumed that companies disclosing voluntary environmental information tend to 
employ less environmentally harmful practices (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). Yet 
Iatridis (2013b) highlights that voluntary disclosures would not necessarily reflect improved 
environmental stewardship. In regards to the relationship between disclosure and environmental 
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performance, socio-political theorists argue that negative associations between environmental 
performance and increased disclosure arise when poor environmental performers face greater political 
and social pressures, and attempt to increase discretionary environmental disclosure to change 
stakeholder perceptions about their actual performance (Clarkson et al., 2008; Gray et al., 1995; 
Patten, 2002)1. Multinational mining companies who do adhere to ‘best practice’ principles of 
effective law enforcement and mechanisms to ensure an auditable accounting process2, are likely to 
strengthen their local and international social licence to operate, reinforce their positive corporate 
governance performance with investors and stakeholders, and build a portfolio for other business 
opportunities (de Villiers and van Staden, 2010; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Holm and 
Rikhardsson, 2006; Rikhardsson and Holm, 2008; Simnett et al., 2009). One study found that the 
attributes of the company in question (size, the need for capital, profitability, and capital spending) are 
positively associated with environmental disclosure quality (Iatridis, 2013a). As such, there is a 
challenge to policymakers to ensure that all companies within their jurisdictions (including those that 
do not exhibit attributes that are positively associated with quality information disclosures) 
appropriately account for the benefits, whilst minimising negative consequences, of extractive 
industries. Understanding payments made by mining companies to governments directly or indirectly 
are important to this end. 
In 2002 the campaign Publish What You Pay (PWYP) was launched by a coalition of NGO’s, 
such as Global Witness along with other founding members, CAFOD, Open Society Institute, Oxfam 
GB, Save the Children UK, and Transparency International UK (PWYP, 2014). The objective was to 
find a commitment for all extractive resource companies to disclose their payments to governments so 
as to foster a more accountable system for the management of natural resource revenues. In the same 
year, at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, Tony Blair, United 
Kingdom’s Prime Minister at the time, launched the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) as the future global transparency standard. The EITI was established through a partnership of 
governments, industry, civil society and investors. The ultimate goal of the EITI is to lead to 
improved sustainable development outcomes through public debate over the effective allocation of 
resource revenues and public finances (Haufler, 2010). Franks (2015) who describes EITI as  kind of 
disclosure standard implemented by governments (e.g. rather than a voluntary standard for 
companies) considers it to have 'made impressive gains for the transparency agenda' (p118) but states 
that the challenge is now to turn what is essentially a reporting process, into better natural resource 
management.  
Our overall objective for this research was to understand whether EITI improves voluntary 
environmental disclosures by mining companies and achieves transparency. To ensure contextual 
comparability we focused on the mining sector within one country, choosing Zambia because of its 
commitment to and uptake of the EITI. We established two aims for the research as follows. 
The primary aim of the research was to measure the level of specificity of disclosure of 
environmental policies and outcomes of mining companies that operate in Zambia, and compare EITI 
reporting companies to similar non-EITI reporting companies. These disclosures were analysed from 
the perspective of whether they achieve transparency in practice with respect to interested third 
parties, and also in relation to company accountability. We follow the rationale of Fox (2007), that 
disclosure or transparency do not directly correlate with accountability, where the latter is aligned 
with the broader EITI goal for sustainable mining outcomes.  
Section 2 examines the research context, and the following section includes data sources, and 
methods for evaluating environmental disclosures. The results are presented in section 4. Sections 5 
and 6 (discussion and conclusion, respectively) examine the results in terms of improving mining 
company transparency and accountability alongside government capacity to facilitate approaches 
where jurisdictions can innovate towards an environmentally sustainable and economically beneficial 
mining sector that minimises future legacy risks.  
 
                                                          
1 Although this research does not focus on the relationship between environmental disclosure and performance, 
the authors would like to acknowledge research by those who have pursued this goal. 
2 Including an appropriate level of information disclosure and clear analysis with the ability of third-party 
interrogation of primary data. 
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2 Research context 
To place our research in context, we briefly consider Zambia’s economy and mining sector 
(2.1), followed by an outline of the EITI and Zambia’s EITI (2.2). We highlight the importance of 
environmental responsibility, financial securities for environmental rehabilitation and historical 
mining legacies (2.3), before explaining the Zambian Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) 
framework, in relation to cases of mine abandonment (2.4). 
 
2.1 A snapshot of Zambia’s economy and mining sector 
Historically, the copper sector has dominated Zambia's mining industry, providing around 60-
70% of domestic product and 90-95% of government revenue in the 1960s (Larmer, 2005). In 1969 
Zambia was classified as a middle-income country with a per capita income higher than Brazil and 
South Korea. After the mid-1970s, Zambia’s copper sector came under pressure from plummeting 
world copper prices, limited re-investment by the government-owned mines, with revenues largely 
used to subsidise social welfare and infrastructure as part of a humanist developmental philosophy 
(Lungu, 2008). Foreign borrowings and adoption of economic liberalisation policies promoted by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund lead to major cuts in public expenditure, the 
introduction of user fees and the privatisation of over 250 parastatals companies that represented 85 
per cent of the Zambian economy (Larmer, 2005). According to Lungu (2008, p409) “…The 
government sold the mines when the price of copper was low and the company was incurring year-on-
year losses. This made it a buyer’s market, and the assets given away cheaply with few strings 
attached. Second, the World Bank pushed the government to sell the assets quickly”. In a relatively 
short period, the ownership structure of Zambia’s copper mines change dramatically with the entry of 
private multinational companies (Fessehaie, 2012). Table 1 presents some of economic figures, and 
the relevance of natural resources in Zambia’s GDP.  
 
Table 1: Zambia population, GDP, inflation and total natural resources rents over time. Source: 
(Bank of Zambia, 2013; World Development Indicator, World Bank database). 
Year 1990 2000 2006 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  
Total natural resources rents 
(% of GDP) 20.72 5.48 20.80 22.07 17.95 18.55 21.78 21.74 19.66 19.44 .. 
GDP growth (annual %) -0.48 3.90 7.90 8.35 7.77 9.22 10.30 6.34 6.73 6.71 6.00 
Population, total (millions) 7.8 10.1 11.7 12.1 12.4 12.8 13.2 13.6 14.0 14.5 15.0 
Inflation rate (%)   8.2 8.9 16.6 9.9 7.9 7.2 7.3   
 
In recent years mineral and energy resources have opened a new investment boom, with 
China cancelling Zambia’s bilateral debt in 2007 and announcing a US$800M in new investment 
(Carmody, 2009). In 2013, Zambia and Uganda were the only African landlocked developing 
countries that had foreign direct investment inflow above US$1,500M (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2014). Presently, Zambia is a service-oriented economy with 
the tertiary sector at 53.7% of GDP, manufacturing at 7.9%, agriculture at 9.9%, and mining at 12.9%. 
The export shares in 2012/2013 significantly constitute copper and related products (66.7%), followed 
by agricultural products (3.5%) and gold and precious stones (3%) (Bank of Zambia, 2013; World 
Bank, 2014).  
 
2.2. A general overview of EITI and Zambian EITI 
In early 2014 during the period in which the data analysis was undertaken, the EITI was a 
multi-stakeholder coalition composed of 89 extractive corporations, 94 institutional investors, 21 
partner organisations, 8 members of international civil society, 27 compliant countries, and 17 
candidate countries (EITI, 2014). Aaronson (2008) highlighted some improvements in the business 
climate (economic growth regulations) and, the voice and accountability scores (the ability of citizens 
to influence government and hold it accountable) improved significantly more for EITI than non-EITI 
countries on average. However, according to Demissie (2014) and Williams (2011) EITI participation 
appears to be negatively related to GDP growth.  
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The disclosure of revenue stream official payments and its disaggregation, that is often secret, 
inaccessible, and unpublished (Haufler, 2010), is an effective means of discovering major 
inconsistencies3 in revenue flow system and in the public supervision systems (Ölcer, 2009). National 
governments are attracted to the EITI as it is expected to escalate their prospectivity as a domestic and 
foreign investment destination (Aaronson, 2001), along with other incentives in the form of aid and 
diplomatic support as pledged by UK and other governments (Haufler, 2010).  
The provisions of the EITI are voluntary, and the candidate countries are required to 
constitute a multi-stakeholder group (MSG), that with the support of a national secretariat meet 
regularly to monitor and oversee the disclosure and reconciliation process. An independent 
administrator who reconciles the payments from industry and the receipt of revenues to government 
leads this process. EITI requires that civil society be represented in the MSG, and that the 
composition process be open and transparent (EITI International Secretariat, 2013; Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2008).  
The participative role of civil society organisations, combined with press freedom, is expected 
to empower citizens to hold governments accountable for the management of revenues. In practice, 
developing countries can be characterised as having a weak and often persecuted civil society 
(Acosta, 2013), an ineffective communication with citizenry (Aaronson, 2011), and lack of capacity 
building to monitor transparency and accountability initiatives. Recognising this, in 2008, EITI++ was 
launched, and a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank provides technical support to 
EITI implementing countries and civil society. Through technical assistance EITI++ aims to improve 
the entire chain of managing: regulatory capacity; local technical skills (governments and civil society 
organisations); operations monitoring; tax collection; economic management decisions, and; public 
management (World Bank, 2013).  
From an industry perspective, although some authors suggest that EITI transfer all the 
pressure from companies to government disclosure (contrary to the PWYP campaign) (Hilson and 
Maconachie, 2008), the disclosure of revenue streams, and the mining contracts or cadastre, increases 
public awareness of ‘millionaire concessions’ and non-advantageous deals for the country. At the 
same time it demonstrates a poor capacity of governments to negotiate investment agreements. 
Importantly, it makes disclosure mandatory for the companies that match the criteria defined by the 
MSG, as well as ascertains the disclosure items consensually decided (industry included).  
There are nonetheless, major criticisms of the EITI, which include: the limited, poor quality, 
and inconsistent data presented in the reports (Brynildsen et al., 2013; Hilson and Maconachie, 2008; 
Ölcer, 2009); the low impact on corruption rankings by EITI member states (Haufler, 2010; Ölcer, 
2009) - albeit with some exceptions, including Azerbaijan, Liberia, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, and Mali  
(Aaronson, 2008); and a ‘soft’ effect on Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) rankings4 (Hilson 
and Maconachie, 2008). Some authors have emphasised that a broadening of scope of the EITI into 
areas of human rights, and linking to judicial institutions would give more credibility and help to 
enforce transparency and accountability (Ölcer, 2009). Franks (2015) suggests that it is now time to 
move towards getting mining companies to move beyond reporting alone and treatment of EITI as 
kind of 'brand' without much other substantive meaning and for them to start living up to explicit 
standards of performance.  
In practice, EITI requirements and achievements are evolving and rely significantly on the 
national MSG dynamics, stakeholders, and political environments. The Revenue Watch Institute 
(2008, p23) published an expected path to EITI implementing countries, starting with EITI Basic, 
which considers the “disclosure of all payments by participants in oil, gas, and mining sectors; 
independent, third party reconciliation; reconciliation of payments reported, and discrepancies found 
to be publicly disclosed; and EITI reconciliation findings to be published regularly”. The mandate 
within EITI is also broadening in terms of the spectrum of scope, moving from reconciliation of 
                                                          
3 For example, in Nigeria the actual amount of oil produced is not known, and the tax assessments submitted by 
two companies do not match their own internal audited financial statements (Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 2012) 
4 Several of Africa’s major solid mineral producers are also classified by the World Bank as HIPC, including 
Ghana (gold), Tanzania (gold), Guinea (bauxite), Zambia (copper), and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(copper, cobalt, and coltan) (Hilson and Maconachie, 2008). 
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financial flows towards value-for-money investment analysis, project benchmarking and moving 
beyond revenues and regional and local supply chain allocations, distribution, receipt and usage 
(Revenue Watch Institute, 2008).  
 In 2007 the government of the Republic of Zambia requested support from the World Bank to 
carry out an EITI scoping study to assess stakeholder governance receptivity and provide practical 
guidance to the government on how to implement the programme (EITI, 2009). Zambia joined the 
EITI in 2009 as a candidate country and became compliant on the 19th September 2012, with the 
presentation of the first reconciliation report relative to 2008 results (pwc, 2011). Since joining 
Zambia has published four reconciliation reports, and an EITI bill is under evaluation by the 
government and by the Zambia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (ZEITI) Council (Moore 
Stephens LLP, 2014b). The establishment of the ZEITI arose from the tension among the major 
stakeholders (mining companies, the government, and civil society organisations) over the 
privatisation of mines in the early 1990s, the perceived lack of transparency in the negotiations of the 
mining agreements, exactly what amounts mining companies were paying to the government, and lack 
of multi-stakeholder dialogue (Zambia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (ZEITI), 2014). 
The companies’ inclusion criteria are defined consensually by the MSG and may vary over time. The 
companies that fit the criteria are obliged to present their payments and all other additional 
information requested by the MSG. For example, in the 2008 EITI reconciliation process the MSG 
required that only companies with large-scale mining licences operational in 2008, and a quantum of 
mineral royalties paid over 200 million Zambian Kwachas (pwc, 2011: 16) would be approached by 
the independent administrator.  
 
2.3. Mine abandonment, historical legacies, and provisioning 
Mining activity can have a significant impact on the environment and societal dimensions of 
human life for the entire mining life cycle, including the legacies of prematurely closed and 
abandoned mine sites. Although during our interviews it was stated that officially there were no 
recorded abandoned mines in Zambia, we visited one abandoned dump site where efforts were being 
made to rehabilitate it. Clearly, the available literature outside official reports in relation to mine 
abandonments and environmental considerations shows a contradictory record. For example, 
according to the World Bank (2011), the mining sector in Zambia has over 70 years of operation, and 
during the 1980-90’s the poor economic performance of the mining sector was associated with 
inadequate handling of environmental issues, and was exacerbated during privatisations since new 
investors were unwilling to accept legal responsibility for historical environmental liabilities. The 
Work Bank reported that the mining-induced environmental and public health liabilities in Zambia’s 
Copperbelt and Kabwe include copper smelters emitting 300,000 to 700,000 tons of sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) per annum, affecting health of residents in adjacent communities, particularly in terms of 
respiratory health. The SO2 emissions were generating sulphuric acid (H2SO4), acidifying soils and 
causing vegetative loss downwind. Additional environmental contamination was due to NOx and 
organic acids entering streams and affecting aquatic fauna. The mining operation chemicals and oils 
with polychlorinated biphenals (PCBs) and other hazardous wastes (including uranium tailings) 
further contributed to local contamination. The impact of water pollution from leaking waste rock 
dumps and tailings dams extended as far as the Kafue River, its tributaries, and wetlands. The risk of 
catastrophic tailing mining dam failure also presents a major risk with poor maintenance combined 
with proximal settlements. In addition to copper mining issues on the Copperbelt, ZCCM-IH5 faces 
serious liabilities related to lead and zinc mining in Kabwe. About 50,000 residents (including 9,000 
children) were affected by high lead levels in the soil, due to a combination of naturally occurring 
mineralisation and smelting and mining operations (World Bank, 2011). According to Blacksmith 
Institute and Green Cross Switzerland (2013), back in 1902 rich deposits of lead were discovered, 
leading mining and smelting operations to run almost continuously for over 90 years without the 
government adequately addressing the dangers of lead and associated heavy metals contaminating the 
surrounding areas.  
                                                          
5 Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – Investment Holdings, is a successor of ZCCM. The Company’s majority 
owned by the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) with nearly 90% shareholding. 
6 
 
As a consequence of these historical legacies, in 2000, the Government of Zambia received a 
US$19M loan and a US$21M grant from the World Bank and a US$10.8M loan from the Nordic 
Development Fund to address mining environmental liabilities and improve future compliance with 
environmental and social regulations (World Bank, 2011). The funds were earmarked for six 
Copperbelt towns Ndola, Kitwe, Chingola, Mufulira, Luanshya, in addition to Kabwe; one of the 
world’s most polluted towns. These loans impacted directly on communities’ health and conducted to 
important reforms such as the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) and other social regulations, but 
our interviewees expressed some apprehension about the framework impact in practice. These 
apprehensions included: an inadequate capacity to enforce the law, limited numbers of inspectors and 
expertise, inefficient and ineffective monitoring, lacking standards and guidelines for mine closure 
procedures, large numbers of artisanal miners unaware of the EPF, environmental and political 
interference (overruled by other ministries), bond securities requests to be domiciled in foreign bank 
accounts abroad, historical liabilities when new owners are asked to fulfil the environmental 
protection regulations, and non-compliance with EPF payments.  
Environmental audits and pollution control practices need to be implemented in a regular 
basis, in a sector that requires more qualified staff and a substantially bigger budget (Lindahl 2014). 
Being able to monitor the environmental impacts of mining activities will allow an evidenced-based 
analysis of environmental impact assessment reports and other important documents submitted by 
mining companies, and a close intervention with local authorities if environmental offences are 
reported.  
A proactive and preventive approach to protect the environment that engages local 
stakeholders, the Mine Safety Department, the Mining Advisory Committee and the Zambia 
Environmental Management Authority and mining companies, may result in better compliance and 
more effective interventions addressing mining environmental liabilities, especially when a license is 
completed or a mine is derelict.  
 
2.4. Zambian Mine closure provisioning and the Environmental Protection Fund 
The specific provisions for mine closure, such as the mine closure plans focused on 
ecological, social and safety aspects, as well as financial provisioning are important instruments for 
all the parties engaged or impacted by mining activities. In Zambia three directors within the Ministry 
of Mines, Energy and Water Development (MMEWD) are responsible for administering the 
provisions established in the Mines and Minerals Development Act (MMDA) of 2008 (Government 
of Zambia, 2008; International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) and Chamber of Mines Zambia 
(CMZ), 2014). They comprise the Mine Advisory Committee (MAC), along with a representative 
each from the ministries responsible for environment and lands, and one person nominated by the 
Attorney-General (MMDA, s88(1)). The MMDA states the conditions for the grant or renewal of a 
licence shall include “the rehabilitation, levelling, regressing, reforesting or contouring of such part of 
land over which the right or licence has effect as may have been damaged or adversely affected by 
prospecting operations, mining operations or mineral processing operations” (MMDA, s116(c), p130). 
In Zambia mine closure planning and/or rehabilitation regulations are included in The Mines and 
Minerals (Environmental) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 29 of 1997 and Statutory Instrument 102 
of 1998.  
The Mines Safety Department (MSD) is the regulator agency responsible for enforcing the 
relevant legislative and statutory instruments on mine closure planning, environmental, and safety 
issues, including the Mines and Minerals (Environmental) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 29 of 
1997 and Statutory Instrument 102 of 1998. The MSD has the responsibility to monitor and undertake 
remediation activities for environmental legacies, from the small-scale mining and exploration 
sectors, and administer the EPF (financial security) (Lindahl, 2014). The EPF assures funds for the 
rehabilitation of mining areas where a holder of a mining licence fails to do so. Although the EPF was 
a statutory entity established by the 1995 Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) (Government of Zambia, 
1995), it was only operationalised in 2007 under the World Bank’s Copperbelt Environment Project 
(World Bank, 2011). The Regulations Statutory Instrument 29 (1997), part VIII obliged the developer 
to contribute to the EPF (s65(1)), and “the contribution shall be deposited with the Fund over a period 
of five years beginning the year the prospecting, exploration or mining operations are commissioned 
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in the case of new ones or when the developer submits an approved [Environmental Impact 
Statement] in the case of existing mines...” (s66(3)).  
Based on interviews held with MSD representatives, the EPF is currently managed by the 
Ministry of Finance, in coordination with the Department. A Fund Manager is expected to be hired in 
the future, to be responsible for the EPF, once sufficient contributions have been made. Table 2 shows 
the cash contributions and bond system of the estimate costs of closure in the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), relating it with the mining operation phase (from category 1 to category 3). It is 
estimated that the developer contributions to the EPF successively decreases over the five-year 
implementation period, depending on how quickly the project moves from environmental category 3 
to 1. According to the World Bank (World Bank, 2011) the amount collected from 30 mining 
companies was US$8 million below the projected and expected required amount. Zambia is the only 
country disclosing this financial security for environmental rehabilitation in EITI’s final reporting 
template, starting it in the first report published in 2012. 
 
Table 2: Fund contributions according to the categories in which the project stands and needed 
intervention, under the MMA (Environmental) Regulations Statutory Instrument 29 (1997) - 
Eleventh Schedule, Regulation 66). 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
Basis: Actions taken to 
rehabilitate 
Basis: Environmental 
compliance capability 
Basis: Operational and strategic 
environmental protection 
requirements 
• ‘Progressive rehabilitation 
carried out; 
• Whether rehabilitation has 
been properly monitored; 
and 
• Whether the annual 
rehabilitation audits show 
progress to meet the target 
of the environmental 
impact statement to manage 
environmental pollution’ 
• ‘The financial capability to 
complete the rehabilitation of 
the mine area; 
• The materials in place for total 
mine area rehabilitation; 
• Whether suitable expertise is 
provided for the organisational 
structure; and 
• Whether the developer or the 
person who holds a mining 
licence or permit has an 
approved EIS or project brief’ 
• ‘An approved EIS or project 
brief; 
• Discharges of mining 
operations are permitted or 
licenced; 
• Post-mining land use and slope 
and profile design, allowing 
stable land rehabilitation within 
the mining or permit area; and 
• A water management system is 
in place or designed to contain, 
treat, discharge or dispose of 
contaminated water.’ 
Cash 
contribution 
% bond of 
estimate costs 
of closure in 
EIS 
Cash 
contribution 
% bond of 
estimate costs 
of closure in 
EIS 
Cash 
contribution 
% bond of 
estimate costs 
of closure in 
EIS 
5% 95% 10% 90% 20% 80% 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
This research draws on a literature review, document analysis, and qualitative primary data 
(interviews) in Zambia (Kitwe) in March and April 2014, with Zambian government representatives 
from the Mine Safety Department (regulator agency on mine closure), and included a visit to one 
abandoned mine. The two interviews enabled us to better understand the Zambian mining regulatory 
framework, governance, mining provisions for closure and issues faced to enforce the financial 
securities for mine closure (EPF). Additional, a telephone interview was performed with a 
representative from the Zambia EITI National Secretariat, in order to understand better the EITI in-
country experience, the EPF and challenges faced by the Secretariat. The Environmental Protection 
Fund is the only environment payment disclosed in Zambia’s EITI reports.  
Comparing and measuring the level of environmental data disclosure and its extensiveness in 
Zambia relied heavily on mining company websites. To build the case study sample we drew upon 
two sources: Zambia’s EITI reporting companies and a sample of companies listed in the mining 
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cadastre. In Zambia’s EITI reports6 from 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, a cumulative list of thirty-two 
reporting companies was evident, but just seventeen of these had a website. Six subsidiary companies 
belonged to three different holding groups (China Nonferrous Metal Mining Co., Ltd, First Quantum, 
and Glencore), so the final number of EITI reporting companies within our sample was fourteen. In 
the analysis of the Zambian mining cadastre the existence of several permits and licenses were found: 
902 active prospecting permits/licenses; 190 active small-scale gemstone; 377 active small-scale 
mining; 79 active large-scale mining, and; 8 active large-scale gemstone. Focused solely on operation 
active licenses/permits, we concluded that when comparing the EITI selection and the mining cadastre 
lists, the EITI mining companies are generally large-scale operators based on a combination of the 
physical size of operations and quantum of mineral royalties paid to the government. From a total of 
50 companies with active large-scale mining licenses and six holding active large-scale gemstone 
licenses, by excluding the EITI reporting firms already accounted for in our sampling, 13 non EITI 
reporting mining companies remained for inclusion in the research. Table 3 presents the two lists of 
mining companies sampled in the research. 
 
Table 3: Sampled companies operating in Zambia. 
 
The mining companies websites were selected as the source for environmental disclosures, 
and we gave special attention to the annual sustainably reports; nevertheless the content analysis was 
extended to corporate statements, press releases, corporate magazines, videos and further information 
displayed in their websites. The data content was analysed and classified into an ‘Environmental 
information disclosure index’, which was based on research interests, the Global Reporting Initiative 
Guidelines (Global Report Initiative, 2015) and Wiseman index (1982). Environmental disclosure 
items on websites of mining companies operating in Zambia were classified into four categories 
related to:  
• Biodiversity - Category 1;  
• Emissions and water - Category 2;  
• Company environmental policy and compliance – Category 3, and;  
• Total environmental protection expenditures and investments - Category 4.  
The 18 checklist criteria arising from these four categories that were used as the basis of the 
disclosure assessment are provided in Table 4. 
 
                                                          
6 Mining company payments are received by the Zambia Revenue Authority. The names of these companies are 
not publicly disclosed, thus the other source for selecting mining companies was the mining cadastre. The 
Zambian mining cadastre (http://www.flexicadastre.com/zambia) was determined to be the most suitable 
alternative option attainable. 
Non-EITI sampled companies EITI selected companies 
Caledonia Nama Limited BHP Billiton World Exploration Inc  
Dangote Quarries Zambia Limited Chambishi Metals Plc 
Enviro Processing Limited CNMC Luanshya Copper mines Plc 
Jagoda Gems Limited Denison Mines Zambia Limited 
Lions Group Quarries Limited First Quantum Mining and Operations Limited 
Lubambe Copper Mine Limited Kagem Mining Ltd 
Macrolink Resources Limited Kariba Minerals Ltd 
Mwembeshi Resources Limited Konkola Copper Mines 
Neelkanth Lime Limited Larfarge Cement Zambia Plc 
Peco Limited Maamba Colieries Limited 
PLR Projects Zambia Ltd Ndola Lime Company Limited 
Redrock Resources Limited Sable Zinc Kabwe Limited 
Tamarisk Investments Limited Universal Mining and Chemical Industries Limited 
 Zambezi Portland Cement Limited 
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Table 4: Environmental disclosure criteria 
Biodiversity (Cat. 1) 
1 Operational sites owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas 
2 
Biodiversity value characterised by: The attribute of the protected area 
or high biodiversity value area outside the protected area (terrestrial, 
freshwater, or maritime ecosystem)  
3 
Description of significant impacts of activities, products and services 
on biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value 
outside protected areas 
4 Habitats protected or restored 
Emissions & Water (Cat. 2) 
5 Direct greenhouse gas emissions (CO2) 
6 NOx (nitrogen oxides), SOx  (sulphur oxides), and other significant air emissions  
7 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused 
Company Policies & Compliance (Cat. 3) 
8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations 
9 Environmental audit mentioned 
10 Firm's environmental protection policies, strategies and goals 
11 One of senior management entrusted with environment responsibility 
Total environmental protection expenditures & investments (Cat. 4) 
12 Land rehabilitated 
13 Remediation costs 
14 Prevention and environmental management costs 
15 Total number and volume of significant spills 
16 Air emission information 
17 Water discharge information 
18 Solid waste disposal 
 
A codification was defined according to the methodologies used by Wiseman (1982) and 
Sumiani et al. (2007) to the degree of specificity reported on the website of the firm; 1) Non-
disclosure; 2) general information; 3) qualitative information; 4) quantitative information, 5) 
combination of two types of information; denoted as: ‘NONE’, ‘GEN’, ‘QUA’, ‘QUAN’, ‘COMB’, 
respectively. The level of specificity of environmental disclosures was used to determine whether it 
achieves transparency in practice. Identification of jurisdictional options for improved transparency 
was addressed from information and ideas gleaned through the overall research effort (i.e. literature, 
document analysis and interviews alike).  
Our research was limited to mining companies operating in Zambia with freely publicly 
available websites, meaning that our sample is not necessarily representative of the entire sector of 
large-scale miners and it specifically excludes the many small scale operators active in the country. A 
further limitation of the research stemmed from mining company constitutions; i.e., where a 
subsidiary and foreign subsidiaries websites could not be found, the company constitution or joint 
ventures were searched, and subsequently the search took place on the holding company and 
multinational corporation web resources, respectively.  
 
4. Results: EITI document analysis in Zambia  
Table 5 shows EITI sampled companies reporting levels are low even when obligations to 
report exist. Only five out of fourteen EITI reporting companies addressed their commitment with the 
initiative regardless of their environmental disclosure performance. This stresses their lack of 
engagement with transparency ‘best practice’. In all, EITI companies disclosed slightly more general 
information (19% vs. 5%), and published significant more materials related to direct greenhouse gas 
emissions (CO2), other air emissions, and water discharge than non-EITI companies. The qualitative 
and quantitative content is very poor in most cases (around 4%). 
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Table 5: Relationship between environmental information disclosed in corporate websites (non-EITI and EITI selected companies). 
  
Non-EITI Mining Companies (n= 13) EITI Mining Companies (n= 14) 
# Environmental data disclosed / Level of Extensiveness  NONE GEN QUA QUAN COMB NONE GEN QUA QUAN COMB 
Biodiversity (Cat. 1)           
1 Operational sites owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas 12 0 1   13 1    
2 
Biodiversity value characterised by: The attribute of the protected area 
or high biodiversity value area outside the protected area (terrestrial, 
freshwater, or maritime ecosystem)  
12 0 1   12 1 1   
3 
Description of significant impacts of activities, products and services 
on biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value 
outside protected areas 
13     12 1 1   
4 Habitats protected or restored 13     11 2 1   Emissions & Water (Cat. 2)           
5 Direct greenhouse gas emissions (CO2) 13     7 5 1 1  
6 NOx (nitrogen oxides), SOx  (sulphur oxides), and other significant air emissions  13     12 2    
7 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused 12 0 0 1  11 3    Company Policies & Compliance (Cat. 3)           
8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations 11 0 1 0 1 11 3    
9 Environmental audit mentioned 11 0 1 0 1 10 3 0 0 1 
10 Firm's environmental protection policies, strategies and goals 6 6 1   6 5 0 0 3 
11 One of senior management entrusted with environment responsibility 12 0 0 1  12 2    Total environmental protection expenditures & investments (Cat. 4)           
12 Land rehabilitated 11 2    11 3    13 Remediation costs 9 2 0 1 1 9 2 0 3  14 Prevention and environmental management costs 11 2 0   12 2    15 Total number and volume of significant spills 12 0 0 1  12 1 0 1  
16 Air emission information 11 1 0 1  10 4    
17 Water discharge information 11 0 0 1 1 8 4 1 1  
18 Solid waste disposal 13     10 3 1   
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Table 5 also shows the items of information that EITI selected companies are 
reluctant/unwilling to disclose on their websites as non-EITI companies:  
• operational sites owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas, and;  
• prevention and environmental management costs.  
In both cases, companies prefer to disclose selective environmental information, highlighting 
their achievements in a particular project or country, and aggregating data describing the 
environmental impact of all their (foreign and local) subsidiaries. For the non-EITI sampled 
companies, the least environmental information items reported were the description of significant 
impacts of activities, products and services on biodiversity in protected areas (and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas), habitats protected or restored, direct greenhouse gas 
emissions (CO2), nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, and other significant air emissions. In contrast, it 
was clear that both the non-EITI and EITI companies are disclosing more information related to their 
environmental protection policies, strategies and goals, and remediation costs. This is likely due to 
shareholder support and potential investor interest related to the statement of financial position. In 
terms of mine closure, companies used various terminologies to make reference to mine closure 
provisions, such as restoration costs (Dangote Quarries Zambia Limited, in financial report 2012 and 
2013), environmental bonds (Peco Limited, in Annual Report 2011 and 2013), restoration provisions 
(Kagem Mining Limited, in Annual Report 2011 and 2014; First Quantum Mining, in Financial 
Report 2013; Tamarisk Investment Limited, in Report and Accounts 2010 to 2013) and provisions for 
environmental liabilities (Lafarge, in Annual Report 2010 to 2013). Overall, no significant qualitative 
variances between specific environmental disclosures of information were provided by non-EITI and 
EITI selected companies operating in Zambia, except the general data provided by EITI reported 
firms. The authors note that these disclosures are irrelevant for a country and project level analysis, as 
is measuring the level of compliance with environmental standards and national legislation.  
  
5. Discussion: Linking international transparency with local environmental innovation 
 As presented in the previous section, the level of specificity of disclosure of environmental 
policies and outcomes of mining companies clearly falls short. Additionally when we look to 
international transparency initiatives such as EITI, and the disclosure of environmental payments and 
policies on the country’s reconciliation reports, the findings also fall short. Based on the country’s 
reconciliation reports published on the EITI’s website in 2014, only Mongolia and Zambia have 
presented disclosure information on environmental payments. Mongolia reported four environmental 
payments in the 2012’s reconciliation report (Fee for air pollution; fee for water use; contribution at 
rate of 50% to environment protection budget7; and expense for environment protection) (Moore 
Stephens LLP and Dalaivan Audit LLC, 2013). Zambia’s reconciliation report presents the payments 
made to the EPF, which is in the top 10 list of payments, representing 0.4% of total revenues collected 
(approximately, A$5,216,601) (Moore Stephens LLP, 2014a). Crucially, these financial security 
payments cannot be considered as revenues, and therefore fall outside the scope of EITI8. 
Nevertheless, its inclusion stresses the evolving dynamics of EITI’s standards, the innovations9 and 
diversity proposed by the national multi-stakeholders group from each compliant country. This is 
particularly so when voluntary codes of conduct are an attractive alternative to direct regulation 
                                                          
7 “If a company performs rehabilitation of environment, that amount is refunded. If not, the authorities will hire 
specialists to rehabilitate damaged land, and invoice the company” (Correspondence via email with Mongolia-
EITI). 
8 EITI’s requirement (n. 4):  “The production of comprehensive EITI Reports that include full government 
disclosure of extractive industry revenues, and disclosure of all material payments to government by oil, gas and 
mining companies” (EITI International Secretariat, 2013, p10) 
9 “Multi-stakeholder groups are encouraged to explore innovative approaches to extending EITI implementation 
to increase the comprehensiveness of EITI reporting and public understanding of revenues and encourage high 
standards of transparency and accountability in public life, government operations and in business (…) In 
reviewing the workplan, the multistakeholder group should consider extending the detail and scope of EITI 
reporting including addressing issues such as revenue management and expenditure (3.7-3.8), transportation 
payments (4.1.f), discretionary social expenditures (4.1.e), ad-hoc sub-national transfers (4.2.e), beneficial 
ownership (3.11) and contracts (3.12).” (EITI International Secretariat, 2013, p14-15)). 
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(Aaronson, 2001), carry political pressure, and have the ability to expose defaulters to government 
institutions/regulators and/or ‘watchdogs’.  
While the EITI is an internationally recognised good governance and accountability initiative 
with some challenges to overcome, it has achieved a diversity of outcomes in different countries, 
differing according to the political environment, the role of MSG members, and the international 
community (EITI International Secretariat, 2013; Revenue Watch Institute, 2008). A major limitation 
of the EITI at present is that it misses the opportunity to require the inclusion of legislated mine 
rehabilitation and closure information and company compliance to them. Achieving a level of 
enhanced transparency by making publically available the details of mine site data at a high precision 
down the tenement level10 (in terms of land disturbance and associated rehabilitation liability) can 
mitigate the presently high level of uncertainty of actual historical and present environmental liability 
that past and present mining companies may be incurring.  
In the context of the ZEITI, this will enable the Zambian government (and other jurisdictions) 
to accurately quantify direct and indirect financial impacts arising from the various mining activities, 
and also assess if the total environmental liability is able to be covered by the financial securities 
being implemented. This level of transparency cannot be achieved without mining companies 
complying with periodic reporting of the level of environmental rehabilitation liability. The associated 
financial implications of rehabilitation to either the company of the government (in the case of a 
company not complying with legislation) must be able to be reasonably estimated by indicative costs 
of the type of disturbance and the total area disturbed during the operation. Such high precision 
reporting exists with comparable legislation and fund-based financial security mechanisms (as 
opposed to unconditional performance bonds), and may be a cost-effective means for companies to 
administer, with inherent incentivises ongoing rehabilitation throughout the mine life (Gorey et al., (in 
review). Such mechanism payments to the fund are tied to actual disturbed land types and areas for 
each tenement with a high level of precision. 
As the present level of mining sector environmental disclosure clearly falls short of what is 
broadly considered to be ‘transparent’ to civil society, we suggest that better outcomes could be 
achieved with linking voluntary international transparency commitments from governments with 
mandatory monitoring, analysis, and enforcement of compliance with jurisdictional laws. Such 
mandatory measures must be clear and publically available down to the level of each tenement, and 
any associated financial security payments be designed to both incentivise innovation in mining 
operations towards international ‘best practice’, and improve the institutional capacity of governments 
to reinforce compliance to the law. In contexts characterised by weak law enforcement, limited 
government resources and capacity, and conflicts of interests, the adherence to transparency 
mechanisms anchored in a tri-party agreements (government, industry and civil society), and the 
inclusion of detailed environmental disclosure, (regardless of whether the mechanism entails revenues 
or not), holds the government and mining companies more accountable. This may lead to 
improvements in enforcement of financial and environmental law. However, a weak civil society, 
poor government institutional capacity, and very limited voluntary environmental reporting by mining 
companies, renders close monitoring of financial and environmental impacts of mining activities and 
any gaps between actual impacts and what is disclosed practically impossible. Therefore, we argue 
that the onus on mining companies to become transparent in practice in terms of environmental 
payments, requiring disclosure of actual disturbed land types and areas (on a ha basis) with a high 
level of precision annually. Such information instruments should be tied to legislation and financial 
security mechanisms to incentivise companies to adhere to and provide incentives for ongoing 
rehabilitation and disturbance minimisation throughout the mine life. The security mechanism 
payments provide ongoing funds to support administrative requirements and ongoing local capacity to 
enforce compliance. 
  
6. Conclusions 
In this research we set out to understand whether EITI improves voluntary environmental 
disclosures by mining companies and achieves transparency. We did this through a combination of 
                                                          
10  Some countries such as Ghana, Indonesia, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands are already disclosing in EITI’s 
report the revenue flows at project level. 
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literature review and document analysis to compare public reporting via company websites for 13 
non-EITI and 14 EITI mining companies operating in Zambia. Interviews with government officials 
and EITI responsibility in Zambia shed further light on our investigation. 
Based on our analysis in Zambia, EITI does not improve voluntary disclosure by companies, 
even when industry, government and civil society make consensual decisions about the type of 
information that should be disclosed. The current level of information disclosure in the Zambian 
minerals sector as an EITI compliant country is insufficiently transparent and further it lacks 
dedicated specialist capacity and enabling funding to determine compliance. Therefore, the current 
arrangements are unlikely to be transparent to civil society organisations. The arrangements 
undermine the notion of a multi-stakeholder group tasked with monitoring and oversight of disclosure 
and reconciliation in EITI processes.  
The Zambian case study provides an example where the legal mechanisms and financial 
provisions for mine closure, and its inclusion in EITI reporting goes some way to improve the level of 
information disclosure. It appears, however, that it is currently impossible to de-couple financial 
payments from environmental impacts. To achieve true transparency in the mining sector the ultimate 
value of a mining activity to a society would be expressed as the financial value minus the full costs 
(including environmental rehabilitation liabilities). In contrast with, for example taxes and royalties, 
the financial payments from companies to governments associated with mining securities are a unique 
transaction (in the Zambian case through the EPF, but elsewhere this is commonly through a mining 
bond mechanism). This transaction is amenable to being used creatively by policymakers to enable 
civil society to easily account for and analyse payments to governments, company performance, and 
compliance with mining laws (McHenry et al., 2015).  
An ideal EITI system would also reinforce compliance with environmental and mine closure 
legislation related to mining financial guaranties, and provide sufficient and clear level of 
transparency (as opposed to simple disclosure of information) to enable civil society both locally and 
internationally to scrutinise both government performance and mining company compliance. The 
continued evolution from the EITI at an aggregated national/company level to a project/tenement 
scale would improve the current lack of transparency for local communities, civil society 
organisations, and also local governments, regarding environmental liabilities and associated 
payments. At this time local entities and communities are enduring the costs of the environmental 
legacies without an effective means to access relevant, clear, and transparent information. 
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